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A MODULAR GOVERNANCE ARCHITECTURE IN-THE-MAKING: HOW 
TRANSNATIONAL STANDARD-SETTERS GOVERN SUSTAINABILITY TRANSITIONS  
 
ABSTRACT 
Sustainability transitions have been studied as complex multi-level processes, but we still know relatively 
little about how they can be effectively governed, especially in transnational domains. Governance of 
transitions is often constrained by the equivocality of sustainability goals, the idiosyncrasy of niche 
experiments and the multiplicity of governance actors and interests. We study the role of transnational 
standard-setters in mitigating these challenges and governing sustainability transitions within a 
transnational sector. Our case is the global coffee sector where ‘sustainability standards’ are increasingly 
being adopted. We find that the emergence of a ‘modular governance architecture’ has helped diverse and 
heterogeneous actors turn sustainability from an ambiguous concept into a concrete set of semi-independent 
practices, while mitigating governance complexity. We show how standard-setters create governance 
modules through local niche experimentation, negotiate and legitimate their content with peers across local 
contexts, and re-integrate them into an emerging architecture. Our findings shed light on the role of modular 
processes in managing sustainability transitions and transnational governance, and the dynamics of 
meaning-making in this process. 
 
Key words: sustainability transitions; transnational standards; experimentalist governance; coffee 
production; modular architecture; triple bottom line 
 
Introduction 
Scholars and policy-makers have increasingly urged for solutions to battle large-scale problems of 
transnational scope, such as environmental degradation and social inequality (Shrivastava, 1995; Bansal 
and Roth, 2000; Newton, 2002; Ansari et al., 2013; Garud and Gehman, 2012; Valente, 2012). This has 
created momentum around notions such as sustainability, poverty reduction, and equality. We focus here 
on the notion of sustainability which has attracted a growing group of scholars who study so-called 
“sustainability transitions”, i.e. paths towards more ‘sustainable’ modes of production and consumption 
(e.g. Smith et al., 2010; Geels, 2010; Hess, 2014; for an overview Markard et al., 2012).  
Sustainability transitions are complex multi-level processes that involve interactions and co-evolutionary 
alignments between socio-technical systems, landscapes, and niches (Geels, 2002, 2010; Kemp et al., 2007). 
To aid transitions, many scholars have argued that some degree of governance is needed, i.e. collective 
processes of steering (Smith et al., 2005; Newig et al., 2007) that include coordination among governance 
actors (Jessop, 2002) and deliberate intervention in local practice (Raven et al., 2010). Prior studies have 
focused on policy efforts as vehicles for governing sustainability transitions (Lauridsen and Joergensen, 
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2010; Romijn and Caniels, 2011; Raven et al., 2010). However, most of these efforts are bound to particular 
local, national or regional contexts. We still know relatively little about how policy objectives can actually 
be translated into “sustainable practice” across geographic boundaries in a whole sector – the main target 
of sustainability transition efforts. A better understanding of such processes is critical since governance of 
sustainability transitions is challenged by three major barriers: (1) the ambiguity of sustainability goals; (2) 
the limited applicability of often idiosyncratic niche experiments across contexts; and (3) the multitude of 
actors, agendas and interests involved in governance processes (Shove and Walker, 2007; Newig et al., 
2007; Voss and Kemp, 2006; Kemp et al. 2007). These challenges are particularly prevalent in transnational 
domains which typically lack sovereign rule-makers to steer transition paths and concerted action. We thus 
seek to investigate: How do multiple governance actors govern sustainability transitions in transnational 
domains, and thereby convert the elusive notion of sustainability into adoptable practices?  
We particularly examine the increasingly important role of transnational standard-setters in governance 
processes in general (Dingwerth and Pattberg, 2009) and sustainability transitions in particular (see e.g. 
Fuenfschilling and Truffer, 2014). In the absence of overarching authority, multiple, private standard-setters, 
such as Fairtrade and Rainforest Alliance, take governance roles by translating expectations from the global 
sustainability discourse and experiences from local producer contexts into adoptable standards of 
“sustainable practice” across sectors and national boundaries. The coffee sector is a particularly interesting 
case since it is widely seen as a pioneer sector for the definition of sustainable farming practices in the 
tropics which other agri-food sectors have emulated over time (Kolk, 2005). Starting from multiple 
fragmented, often locally bounded, niche innovations in the 1980s and 1990s, the share of sustainably 
produced coffee (measured by certified or verified coffee volume) has steadily increased globally from less 
than 1% in 2000 to 16% in 2008 and 40% in 2012 (SSI, 2014).  
Our central finding is that standard-setters have promoted and shaped sustainability transition processes 
through a collectively produced and continuously evolving modular governance architecture. Modular 
means that sustainability goals are translated into standards through an evolving set of manageable, 
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adaptable, quasi-independent governance modules, e.g. ‘soil conservation’ and ‘child labor’, along the triple 
bottom line – economic prosperity, environmental quality, and social equity. Architecture means that along 
with governance modules, standard-setters specify linkages between modules which are weak yet not 
negligible. Standard-setters thereby repeatedly (1) create new governance modules by aggregating findings 
from local niche experiments into more general rules, also driven by their own interests and agendas; (2) 
negotiate and adjust the content of governance modules through interchanges with peers and global 
discourse to legitimate them in transnational transition networks; and (3) re-integrate modules into an 
emerging architecture by creating multiple interfaces. Through this modular governance architecture, 
standard-setters have been able to reduce ambiguity around global sustainability goals; account for 
differences in local practice conditions; and facilitate coordination among multiple standard-setters. 
Our findings make two major contributions to the literature on sustainability transitions. First, by examining 
how “sustainable practice” can be promoted across geographic boundaries through a modular governance 
architecture we contribute to our understanding of transition management (Kemp et al., 2007; Raven et al., 
2010). Specifically we show how governance complexity in sustainability transitions can be managed 
(Shove and Walker, 2007; Voss et al., 2007), how governance structures can be made more ‘participatory’ 
(Ferraro et al., 2015), and how the overall collective capacity of governance actors to promote change can 
be increased (see also Eberlein et al., 2014). Our focus on modular governance processes also specifies a 
critical mechanism through which the tension between the need for generic and concrete adaptable solutions 
(Brunsson et al., 2012) can be managed, in particular in transnational domains (see also Grunwald, 2000; 
Sabel and Zeitlin, 2012). Second, we contribute to a more dynamic understanding of meaning-making in 
sustainability transitions. Whereas prior research has focused on ‘meaning-making processes’ in local 
settings (Nicolini, 2011; Schatzki, 1997; Shove and Walker, 2010) and the problem of ambiguity at the 
global level (Gray, 2010; Voss et al. 2007; Smith and Stirling, 2007), we show how the meaning of 
sustainability is constituted and shaped at the transnational level, across particular geographic contexts.  
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Next, we elaborate sustainability transitions as a multi-level governance problem. We then introduce 
standard-setters as important governance actors in this process. This is followed by an introduction of the 
global coffee sector. After explaining our data and methods we report our findings on governance activities 
of transnational standard-setters in coffee. We conclude with implications for research on governance in 
sustainability transition and point out key implications for policy-makers. 
 
The Challenge of Governing Sustainability Transitions in Transnational Sectors 
Many scholars have grappled with the question of how socio-technical systems can be made more 
‘sustainable’ (Markard et al., 2012; Geels, 2010; Kemp et al., 2007). Socio-technical systems are typically 
understood as relatively stable configurations of individual and organizational actors, their relations and 
practices, and institutions (norms, standards), technologies and knowledge supporting the production of 
goods and services (Raven et al., 2010; Geels, 2004; Garud and Gehman, 2012; Rip and Kemp, 1998). 
Socio-technical systems are more or less ‘sector-specific’, i.e. specific to particular goods and services. In 
this study we focus on the global coffee sector and its system of production and trade relations and practices. 
Socio-technical systems are further characterized by certain dominant logics, norms and deep structures 
called ‘regimes’ (Geels and Schot, 2007; Geels, 2011), which stabilize systems, but also present a barrier 
for system-level change (Raven et al., 2010; Fuenfschilling and Truffer, 2014).  
Sustainability transitions of socio-technical systems, i.e. changes towards more sustainable modes of 
production and consumption, are very complex (Markard et al., 2012). They are examples of what Ferraro 
et al. (2015) refer to as ‘grand challenges’, i.e. unresolved problems that are complex, uncertain and 
ambiguous. Several scholars have argued that, similar to socio-technical transitions (Rip and Kemp, 1998; 
Geels, 2002; Geels and Schot, 2007), sustainability transitions can only happen through complex 
interactions and co-evolutionary alignments between socio-technical ‘landscapes’, protected niches, and 
socio-technical systems (Geels, 2010; Smith et al. 2010; Kemp et al., 2007). We briefly introduce the 
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interplay of these multi-level dynamics, and then focus on approaches to and challenges of governing 
sector-wide transitions, especially in transnational domains. 
On the one hand, socio-technical systems interact with socio-technical landscapes. These are typically 
understood as exogenous sets of political, economic, social and technological factors affecting both the 
continuous operation and transformation of established systems (see e.g. Raven et al., 2010). Landscapes 
are a combination of relatively stable structures, such as global institutions, macro-economic conditions, 
cultural norms, and technical infrastructures, and more dynamic processes, such as economic shocks, social 
movements and political discourses (Van Driel and Schot, 2005; Geels and Schot, 2007). We focus in this 
study in particular on the global sustainability discourse as an important enabler (but also barrier) of 
sustainability transitions in socio-technical systems. 
On the other hand, socio-technical systems interact with niches which can be regarded as smaller-scale 
versions of such systems (Geels and Schot, 2007). They are often seen as ‘protected spaces’ (Smith and 
Raven, 2012) or ‘incubation rooms’ (Schot, 1998) within which radical innovations and changes can be 
initiated and ‘tested’ (Raven et al., 2010). From an evolutionary view, niches may create variations which 
are needed to stimulate system-level changes (Geels, 2002). More specifically, Geels (2002) argues that 
niche-innovations may build up momentum for system-level change at times when changes at the landscape 
level also generate pressure and help de-stabilize established norms and practices. Niches may exist in terms 
of specific (protected) industry or technological domains (Geels, 2002), or as localized settings that are 
‘protected’ from outside competitive and other selection pressures through geographic boundaries (Coenen 
et al., 2012). We focus in this study on niches in terms of practice experiments in local producer contexts 
that may inform ‘sustainable practice’ in a particular sector. 
Many scholars further agree that the complex and political nature of ‘sustainable development’ necessitate 
some degree of governance to effectively promote system change (Smith et al., 2005; Smith and Stirling, 
2007; Voss and Bornemann, 2011; Shove and Walker, 2007). Governance in our context consists of two 
main aspects: First, it concerns the ability of key promoters of sustainability transitions – ‘governance actors’ 
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– to organize themselves to ‘get things done’, despite often diverging interests and distributed access to 
resources and expertise (see also Jessop, 2002). Governance thus often builds on ‘distributed agency’, 
which necessitates a participatory structure; some flexibility in interpreting actions and outcomes; and 
ongoing, distributed experimentation in local contexts (Ferraro et al., 2015; Sabel and Zeitlin, 2012). 
Second, and relatedly, governance refers to individual and collective efforts of “organiz[ing] and sustain[ing] 
attempts to change the behavior of targeted actors to address a collective problem or attain a collective end” 
(Eberlein et al., 2014). It should thus allow for both “collective action” and “deliberate interventions” in 
transition processes (Shove and Walker, 2007), including the constitution of a ‘transition arena’; the 
development and articulation of a unifying vision; the mobilization of actors and resources for concrete 
projects; and continuous evaluation of the undertaking (Voss and Bornemann, 2011; Kemp and Loorbach, 
2006; Smith et al., 2005). Some scholars also refer to multi-level ‘transition management’, which builds on 
continuous cycles of experimentation and learning, combining long-term planning with incremental change 
(Kemp et al., 2007; Grunwald, 2000).  
Governance processes in sustainability transitions have been examined mostly in terms of policy efforts at 
the level of repeated niche experiments and, to a lesser extent, at the level of landscape-level policies (Genus 
and Cole, 2008). On the one hand, scholars have examined so-called ‘strategic niche management’ (Raven 
et al., 2010). The idea is to mobilize various stakeholders to create ‘artificial niches’ where new practices 
and technologies can be tested and refined, in order to be ‘scaled up’ later on. For example, Romijn and 
Caniels (2011) examine the development of ‘Jatropha’ biofuels production in Tanzania as a niche 
experiment for promoting alternative energy sources across developing countries. Similarly, several studies 
have examined how sustainability certifications are tested as ‘proto-institutions’ at the local level as 
templates for larger-scale global change (Lawrence et al., 2002; Manning and Von Hagen, 2010). On the 
other hand, several studies have examined the role of government or inter-governmental policies as a major 
source of institutional pressure on established system-level practices (Boli and Thomas, 1997; Maguire and 
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Hardy, 2006; Meyer, 2010), such as the execution of the Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE) 
directive of the European Union (Lauridsen and Joergensen, 2010).  
Yet, our knowledge of how governance efforts can effectively promote system change remains rather 
limited (Smith et al., 2010; Genus and Coles, 2008; Kivimaa, 2014). Coenen et al. (2012) particularly stress 
that we need to better understand system-level changes of business practice in transnational domains. This 
is because many sectors span territorial boundaries, linking localized activities with trans-local networks. 
In such domains, inter-governmental policies and discourses are often very distant from local practice 
conditions. For example, whereas the discourse around sustainable food production takes place mainly in 
consumer countries, the implementation of (more) sustainable practice happens (or is designed to happen) 
primarily in producer countries. We seek to better understand transnational governance of sustainability 
transitions in sector-wide practices, i.e. regularized and institutionalized modifications of activity patterns 
of sector participants in line with sustainability objectives.  
Analyzing governance processes in sustainability transitions in general and in transnational domains in 
particular requires to pay attention to three core interrelated obstacles which have been discussed in prior 
studies (see e.g. Kemp et al., 2007): (1) the ambiguity of the meaning of sustainability as a concept used in 
global discourse; (2) the diversity of local practice conditions and experiments; and (3) the multitude of 
governance actors, interests and agendas in the sustainability arena. 
First, many scholars have noted that, despite continuous governance efforts, the very concept and goal of 
‘sustainability’ remain highly ambiguous (Gray, 2010; Voss et al. 2007; Shove and Walker, 2007; Smith 
and Stirling, 2007), i.e. it invites a multitude of parallel interpretations (Weick, 1995). Even though some 
authors contend that multi-vocality and interpretive flexibility (Pinch and Bijker, 1987) allow 
heterogeneous actors to participate in addressing large-scale problems (Ferraro et al., 2015), others have 
emphasized the challenges resulting from goal ambiguity (e.g. Voss and Bornemann, 2011). Lauridsen 
and Joergensen (2010) find that conflicting interpretations around what the new EU waste policy actually 
means has created substantial obstacles to effective system change. Interpretations may also shift over time 
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and remain subject to ongoing political contestation (Voss and Bornemann, 2011; Fourcade, 2011). To 
illustrate, nuclear power has been treated at certain times as a threat to a sustainable future, and at other 
times as a sustainable and emission free source of energy (Garud et al., 2010). 
Arguably, the problem of ambiguity has increased over time. In the early years of the global discourse, 
“sustainability” was linked to ecological limits to global economic growth, e.g. by the Club of Rome in 
1972. Later, the concept incorporated what is widely known as the ‘triple bottom line’, which links 
environmental quality to economic prosperity and social equity (Elkington, 1998). This discursive shift was 
initiated by the UN Brundtland Commission which argued that “[t]he environment does not exist as a sphere 
separate from human actions, ambitions, and need” (WCED 1987, p. 13). As a result, “sustainability” has 
become an umbrella term for formerly separate and partly conflicting objectives, such as environmental 
protection and economic growth. This ambiguity presents a critical burden to coherent collective action. It 
hampers the development of a unifying vision; the mobilization of actors for joint projects; and a consistent 
evaluation of sustainability projects (see e.g. Voss and Kemp, 2006).  
Second, it remains unclear how governance can help aggregate local niche experiments into more generic 
lessons and rules (Coenen et al., 2012) so as to inform mainstream practice. Experiments are often 
idiosyncratic and embedded in specific territorialized settings, which potentially constrain their 
applicability across contexts. In the transitions literature, this is referred to as the ‘upscaling’ problem 
(Raven et al., 2010). Whereas processes of implementing and adapting already established practices in 
different local contexts are well understood (see e.g. Bechky, 2003; Nicolini, 2011; Perez-Aleman, 2011), 
the process by which niche experiments may promote sector-level practice is less clear. One key problem 
is that parallel experiments, while supporting the sustainability agenda, bear the risk of ‘disjointed 
incrementalism’ (Lindblom, 1959; Voss et al. 2007). By contrast, more ‘directed’ incremental change 
(Grunwald, 2000; Kemp et al., 2007) requires coordination across experiments, continuous learning and a 
shared agenda between governance actors (Bos et al., 2013).   
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However, governance is further complicated by a third major problem – the multitude and heterogeneity of 
governance actors, interests and agendas (Kemp et al., 2007). As the global sustainability agenda has 
expanded and the range of practice experiments has increased, the number of participants in the 
sustainability arena has risen as well (Kuhlmann, 2012; Shove and Walker, 2007; Voss and Kemp, 2006). 
Relatedly, the ineffectiveness of intergovernmental regulation in recent decades (Newton, 2002) has invited 
a wide range of private actors, including NGOs and corporations, to bring in their own interests, resources 
and agendas into often ongoing processes of negotiating transnational governance instruments (Bartley, 
2007; Eberlein et al., 2014). For instance, in coffee, cocoa, textiles, and other sectors multiple social and 
environmental standard-setters with different goals and agendas have been competing for adopters 
(Fransen, 2011; Reinecke et al., 2012; SSI, 2014). Whereas some scholars appreciate the participation of 
various actors as potentially productive (Rasche 2010; Sørensen, 2006), others have noted the increasing 
complexity of coordinating collective efforts when multiple, often conflicting interests and agendas 
participate in the process (Banerjee, 2003; Hoffman and Bazerman, 2007; Levy and Lichtenstein, 2011; 
Newig et al., 2007). This is true not only for governance efforts at the niche level, but, to an even greater 
extent, when it comes to promoting solutions for sector-wide change. 
 
Promoting Practice Change in Transnational Sectors: The Role of Standard-Setters  
To better understand governance processes in sustainability transitions, especially in transnational sectors, 
we need to pay more attention to governance actors who operate at the “global-local node” of global 
transition networks (Coenen et al. 2012, p. 976). Given the limited ability of governments to regulate 
business affairs in transnational domains, non-state actors, including multi-stakeholder initiatives, standard-
setters and NGOs, have become important in what Eberlein et al. (2014) call ‘transnational business 
governance’ (see also Abbott and Snidal, 2001; Bartley, 2007; Helms et al., 2012; Rasche, 2012). We focus 
on the governance role of transnational standard-setters in this study. 
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Standards have become a pervasive part of organizational life (Brunsson et al., 2012). In general, they can 
be defined as “rule(s) for common and voluntary use, decided by one or several people or organisations” 
(p. 616). Importantly, standards typically do not just operate within particular local contexts, but embody 
“conformities across time and space” (Timmermans and Epstein, 2010, p.71). Standards thereby include 
“codified specifications about components and their relational attributes” (Garud and Kumaraswamy, 1993, 
p. 353), whereby these specifications may relate to processes or products, technical or non-technical 
domains (Brunsson et al., 2012). In any case, standards embody “technological, institutional or cultural 
patterns” (Voß et al., 2006, p. 175) that stabilize, legitimate and ‘protect’ established practices within 
sectors (Markard et al., 2012; Garud and Gehman, 2011; Geels and Schot, 2007), but also contribute to 
sedimenting and institutionalizing new practices and norms (Tolbert and Zucker, 1999). Standards are thus 
being recognized as important vehicles of change in sustainability transitions (Fuenfschilling and Truffer, 
2014). For example, Raven et al. (2010) argue that standardization and codification are critical mechanisms 
through which niche experiments can be ‘scaled up’ to the sector level. In our context, we are particularly 
interested in the emergence of so-called ‘sustainability standards’, i.e. “voluntary predefined rules, 
procedures, and methods to systematically assess, measure, audit and/or communicate the social and 
environmental behavior and/or performance of firms” (Gilbert et al., 2011, p. 24). 
Standards are developed by standard-setters who belong to the community of ‘rule-making organizations’ 
(Dingwerth and Pattberg, 2009). Examples include the Forest Stewardship Council, Fairtrade, Rainforest 
Alliances and other standard-setters that we look at in more detail later. Transnational sustainability 
standard-setters have in common that they (a) operate transnationally, (b) establish fairly precise behavioral 
prescriptions and link them to measurable indicators and verifiers that can be monitored, (c) set rules that 
are at least minimally effective, and (d) frame rules in support of social and/or environmental sustainability 
(Dingwerth and Pattberg, 2009). In addition, the meta-organization ISEAL, which was founded to regulate 
and ‘standardize’ sustainability standard-setters (Reinecke et al., 2012), defines those standard-setters as 
credible that (a) involve multiple stakeholders in standard-setting processes, (b) develop methods for 
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measuring impact, and (c) include mechanisms to assure compliance through certification and accreditation 
(Loconto and Fouilleux, 2014; ISEAL, 2010). Standard-setters do not act ‘as one unit’ but rather as a 
transnational network of independent, heterogeneous organizations. Agency in promoting sector-wide 
change is thus distributed rather than centrally coordinated.  
In setting ‘sustainability standards’, transnational standard-setters thus face two key related tensions: 
between the common objective of ‘sustainability’ and their individual interests and agendas, and between 
defining abstract ‘global’ rules for ‘common use’ in line with sustainability goals and ensuring the 
implementation of concrete ‘local’ practices (Brunsson et al., 2012). For this reason, ISEAL, for example, 
does not impose a particular operationalization of ‘sustainability’ on their members, but rather allows them 
to define their own rules and criteria, as long as they are measurable and certifiable, and multiple 
stakeholders take part in defining them (Loconto and Fouilleux, 2014). This approach follows the principle 
of ‘experimentalist governance’ (Sabel and Zeitlin, 2012) where rather than determining policy goals and 
methods ex ante, they are instead discovered in the course of problem-solving.  
Specifically, Sabel and Zeitlin (2012) propose a flexible, adaptable governance architecture where rather 
broad (central) framework goals, such as food safety, can be implemented and tested in local practice. 
Similarly, Ferraro et al. (2015) suggest that tackling grand challenges, such as sustainability transitions, 
require a ‘participatory architecture’ that allows ‘diverse and heterogeneous actors to interact’ and engage 
in ‘distributed experimentation’ at the local level. However, we still know very little about how such a 
participatory governance architecture may emerge and operate, especially in transnational domains. Also, 
we need to better understand how governance actors with different interests and agendas may effectively 
participate in such a governance structure. In this study we thus seek to specify how ‘participatory 
architectures’ in support of ‘experimentalist governance’ (Sabel and Zeitlin, 2012) or ‘distributed 
experimentation’ (Ferraro et al., 2015) are constituted, by focusing on the work of transnational standard-
setters in the coffee sector. We find that one critical mechanism through which standard-setters, with 
partially diverging agendas, coordinate themselves, and also manage the tension between the need for 
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generic and concrete adaptable solutions (Brunsson et al., 2012) is modularity, i.e. the creation, negotiation 
and re-integration of semi-independent building blocks of ‘sustainable practice’ into an emerging ‘modular 
governance architecture’. Importantly, this architecture has enabled ongoing experimentation as well as 
standardization of ‘sustainable practice’ across local settings. However, there is no ‘central architect’; rather, 
this transnational governance architecture has been the more or less intended outcome of ongoing 
coordination and negotiation at the modular level. We discuss this process in detail below. First, we 
introduce the empirical context: global coffee production. 
 
Global Coffee Production and Sustainability Standards 
Coffee is the most widely traded agricultural commodity in the world, accounting for exports worth an 
estimated USD 33.4 billion in 2012 (SSI, 2014). The global coffee sector can be described as a socio-
technical system of production, trade and consumption that spans across the world but mainly serves 
consumers in advanced economies, in particular U.S., Western Europe, and Japan (Perez, 2011). The system 
is largely controlled by a handful of powerful coffee roasters based in some of the largest markets – U.S. 
and Western Europe – who buy, process and sell coffee beans from thousands of smallholder and larger-
scale producers in South America, Africa and Southeast Asia. Coffee production is very fragmented. 25 
million smallholder producers, who are directly dependent on coffee for their livelihoods, produce 80% of 
the world’s coffee. Largest producing countries, in terms of volume, are Brazil, Indonesia, Vietnam and 
Colombia, combining a market share of around 65% (ICO, 2013).  
The global coffee sector is an interesting example of an ongoing ‘sustainability transition’ – from primarily 
market and price-driven production and trade in the 1990s to practices that are seen as increasingly socially 
and environmentally ‘sustainable’ (Ponte, 2002; Kolk, 2005). The dismantling of the International Coffee 
Agreement (ICA) in 1989, which used to stabilize coffee prices and demand for coffee beans (Pichop and 
Kemegue, 2005/6), led to fierce price competition and a rather unsustainable cost-driven market logic 
resulting in poverty and distress for coffee farmers and communities, but also severe product quality and 
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supply chain security problems for buyers. Facing fierce price competition, labor and living conditions for 
farmers deteriorated, including discrimination, low wages and temporary employment. In addition, cost 
pressure accelerated the conversion of primary forest habitat, loss of biodiversity, soil erosion, 
agrochemical use, and pollution, resulting in environmental challenges that endanger the health of coffee 
communities as well as the planet. These consequences along with a decreasing interest of young people in 
entering coffee farming also put the global coffee business in danger, including lower quality of coffee 
beans and increasing challenges of serving growing demand for both budget and premium coffee.  
In face of these challenges, the coffee sector has become a testing ground for sustainability initiatives and 
standards (Kolk, 2005; Manning et al., 2012; Ponte, 2002). Although international agreements, such as ICO, 
still exist, their regulatory power has diminished (Pichop and Kemegue, 2005/6). Instead, voluntary 
standards, along with certification and accreditation bodies, have become important means of governing 
the sector and of promoting a transition towards a more sustainable system of coffee production and trade 
(Kolk, 2005; Reinecke et al., 2012). The effect of standards adoption on farmers has been evidenced in 
several studies (TCC, 2012). According to an impact study in Colombia (CRECE, 2013), farmers certified 
by AAA (Nespresso) and Rainforest Alliance have significantly improved their social conditions, including 
health and safety; economic conditions, including productivity and income; and environmental conditions, 
including soil and water conservation. Due to higher productivity, better quality control and professional 
farm management, net income levels are reported to be 46% higher for certified than for non-certified 
farmers, and 87% of certified farms now run recycling programs compared to 43% of conventional farms 
(CRECE, 2013).  
Given the role of sustainability standards in promoting more sustainable coffee production, it is important 
to understand how they translated the multi-vocal concept of sustainability into meaningful practices over 
time. As multi-stakeholder governance initiatives, sustainability standard-setters are not homogenous 
entities, but are themselves the outcome of conflict and compromise between a variety of interests and 
agendas with starkly differing degrees of emphasis (Bartley, 2007). Table 1 gives an overview of objectives, 
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origin and target groups of major sustainability standards in coffee. Initially, NGO-led initiatives grew out 
of multiple, fragmented niche experiments with alternative ways of coffee production and trade. They have 
played a key role in pressurizing coffee roasters to adopt sustainable sourcing practices. For example, the 
Organic standard emerged in the 1970s from a coalition of environmental activists concerned with banning 
the use of pesticides and other chemicals to protect the health of farmers and the environment. The first 
Fairtrade standard-setter, Max Havelaar (Netherlands), originates in the efforts of indigenous peasant 
communities in the Mexican state of Oaxaca to get better prices for their coffee crops (Boersma, 2009). 
This led to the creation of the Fairtrade label in 1989, which signified the payment of a fair price, and more 
generally the aim of economically empowering small-scale farmers in the Global South. In parallel, a 
network of conservation groups forming the Sustainable Agriculture Network (SAN) grew out of concerns 
raised by researchers and environmentalists in the 1980s that the agricultural production model of mono-
cultured, sun-grown coffee might lead to the destruction of the world’s tropical forests and critical habitat 
losses. Various research projects on ecosystems in Guatemala, Mexico and Costa Rica led by SAN member 
organizations concluded that shade-grown coffee promotes the conservation of forest and its biodiversity. 
SAN members founded the Rainforest Alliance in 1987 and started programs experimenting with better 
farm management practices and certification as a tool for conserving forest habitats, with the first coffee 
farm certified in Guatemala in 1996. Similarly, in 1996/7, a group of biologists at the Smithsonian 
Migratory Bird Institute, Washington, DC, who were concerned with preserving the habitat of birds, found 
that shade coffee mimics forests. Combining organic and shade-grown practice, they created the “Bird 
Friendly” certification. 
In response, major coffee brands started to adopt NGO standards in early 2000s, but also created their own 
corporate standard programs which have become participants in the standards arena. For example, the 
Dutch firm Ahold launched Utz Kapeh in 1997 (later UTZ Certified) together with suppliers to expand 
‘sustainable coffee’ to mainstream coffee consumption. Other industry-driven standards include Nespresso 
AAA Sustainable Quality (2003) and Starbucks C.A.F.E. Practices (2004). In 2004, major coffee roasters, 
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together with the German Development Agency GTZ (today: GIZ) developed the Common Code for the 
Coffee Community (4C) to offer a baseline sustainability standard. In 2002, pioneering sustainability 
standard-setters, including Fairtrade, Rainforest Alliance, Organic and UTZ Certified, founded the ISEAL 
Alliance – a global membership organization which has since played a critical role in coordinating and 
aligning activities of standard-setters, thereby contributing to the growth, legitimacy and governance of the 
sustainability standards movement (Loconto and Fouilleux, 2014). 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> INSERT TABLE 1 <<<<<<<<<<<<<<<< 
All major sustainability standards today refer to the Triple Bottom Line of sustainability by aligning their 
offerings with the three pillars environmental quality, social equity and economic prosperity (see in detail 
below). ISEAL thereby played a major role in promoting mutual observation and learning between 
standard-setters (Loconto and Fouilleux, 2014). However, despite a tendency towards convergence, 
standards have maintained their own identity, partly based on their historical roots and strategies of 
differentiation (Reinecke et al., 2012). As we elaborate in detail below, the very ambiguity and openness 
of the objective of sustainability have allowed multiple standards to co-exist, but also prevented 
consolidation. However, quite strikingly, the share of sustainably produced coffee (in terms of coffee 
volume) has steadily increased in recent years, from less than 1% in 2000 to 16% in 2008 and 40% in 2012 
(SSI, 2014). Adoption of sustainability standards is thus becoming a mainstream practice among suppliers, 
and standard-setters have proven to be important governance actors in driving the sustainability transition 
in the coffee sector. We now seek to examine in detail what governance processes standard-setters have 
engaged in to effectively promote and translate the sustainability agenda into practice, despite the 
governance complexity involved in it. 
Data and Methods 
We take an embedded case approach combining multiple data sources to address our research question (Yin, 
2003). Qualitative case analysis is useful to understand complex processes, such as governance in 
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sustainability transitions, and to build theory inductively (Langley, 1999; Siggelkow, 2007). We first 
introduce our data sources and then explain how we analyzed the data.  
Data Sources 
Our data were drawn from three sources: 64 in-depth interviews with actors involved in the creation of 
sustainability standards, six months participant observation of a standard-setter, and archival data. This 
longitudinal study (Pettigrew, 1990) consists of three phases of data collection between 2001 and 2011. 
In 2001/2, data collection focused on early experiments of sustainability certification, including pilot 
projects leading to the Common Code for the Coffee Community (4C). 11 Interviews were conducted with 
representatives of corporate actors (e.g. Kraft Foods) and the German Agency for Technical Development 
Cooperation (GTZ, later: GIZ) as an important facilitator in the 4C process. In 2007, a participant 
observation study of the Fairtrade Labelling Organizations (FLO) was conducted. Fairtrade was chosen as 
a key standard widely credited to have “impacted other operators and prompted the emergence of other 
sustainability regimes” (European Commission 2009, p. 4). One author spent about 9 hours per working 
day over six months to shadow actors in the Standards Unit and collect observations of the standards 
development process. In addition, 31 interviews with Fairtrade staff members, Fairtrade licensees and 
external consultants were conducted. Interviews focused on challenges of resolving tensions around 
partially conflicting sustainable development goals in the process of developing the Fairtrade standard.  
In 2010/11, we conducted 22 interviews with the aim to understand the coordination among multiple 
standard-setters. These included follow-up interviews with previous respondents from Fairtrade and 4C, 
and also with representatives from Rainforest Alliance, Nespresso, producer organizations, experts and 
development agencies. Interviews focused on the increasing interaction of standard-setters in making sense 
of the elusive and complex notion of sustainability. We also participated in four sustainability standards 
workshops and conferences and had numerous informal conversations with standard-setters and actors from 
the coffee industry. We continued data collection until we had reached “crystallization” (Janesick, 2000) 
and gained “an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon in question” (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000). On 
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average, interviews lasted 1.15 hours. All 64 interviews but three were transcribed verbatim leading to over 
620 single-spaced pages of transcriptions. 
Interview and observation data were complemented by archival data. We gathered publicly available 
information from standard-setters, research institutions, coffee roasters, retailers and media websites 
spanning the period from 2001 to 2011. We reviewed publicly available annual reports, press releases and 
standards documents. In addition, we gathered data from industry statistics and reports, journal publications 
and a number of benchmarking studies. 
Data Analysis 
We imported all data into NVivo to organize and analyze our different sources of data. In an inductive, 
open-ended iterative process, we travelled back and forth between data, literature and emerging theory 
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967). Through ‘open’, ‘thematic’, and ‘theoretical’ coding (Strauss and Corbin, 1990) 
we categorized raw data, linked categories to themes and aggregated them into a theoretical process 
framework we discuss at the end of the paper. 
In a first round of exploratory, open coding, we mapped the landscape of multiple sustainability standards 
and tracked their development over time. We were particularly interested at this point in what major 
challenges standard-setters have faced in their efforts to meaningfully contribute to promoting sustainable 
practice, and how they have responded to these challenges. For example, one important guiding question 
for us was how standard-setters have responded to the growing consensus on the ‘triple bottom line’ of 
sustainability and its related consequences, including the growing ambiguity around what sustainability 
means as well as the growing number of standard-setters, agendas and interests. 
We then benchmarked standards in order to identify standard elements which were commonly associated 
with sustainability, as well as elements which were contested and changed in meaning. For example, all 
standards have adopted ILO “core labor standards” which we would classify as a governance module most 
major standards agree upon. To enhance the robustness of our analysis, we triangulated our interview data 
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with secondary reports and standardsmap.org – a web-tool that allows for comparison of indicators and 
criteria included in a wide range of standards. This historical and comparative mapping helped us acquire 
an in-depth understanding of the emerging definition of sustainability and its evolution over time.  
Second, through thematic coding we focused on how standard-setters have engaged in governance 
processes both through internal adjustments and external negotiations. More concretely, we analyzed how 
standard-setters have ‘enacted’ emerging themes of the global discourse, local practice conditions and 
associated problems, and their own interests and agendas vis-à-vis other standard-setters. We then identified 
various activities standard-setters have engaged in to build and refine their own standard and to relate to 
and position themselves vis-à-vis other standards.  
In a third step of theoretical coding, we constructed theoretically informed categories for major types of 
governance activities of standard-setters through cross-referencing of existing codes and the addition of 
another layer of theoretically meaningful higher-order codes. This transcended the categorization of 
observable phenomena to uncover their implicit meanings and underpinning processes (Langley, 1999). 
We went back to existing literature for constructs that could help us better interpret our data (Walsh and 
Bartunek, 2011). In particular, we identified a strong resemblance between activities of standard-setters and 
processes of modularization as described in the literature on organizational design and complexity 
(Henderson and Clark, 1990; Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996; Zhou, 2013). However, we also identified 
importance differences. We discuss both similarities and differences further below. 
Based on this triangulation between our data and existing theory, we categorized three main processes 
transnational standard-setters have repeatedly engaged in: (1) creating (new) governance modules through 
local niche experimentation; (2) negotiating the content of modules with peers to legitimate them across 
local contexts; and (3) re-integrating modules into an emerging governance architecture. We merged and 
revised thematic codes until our analysis failed to reveal new relationships or alternative explanations. We 
also discussed our findings with a sustainability standards expert from an intergovernmental development 
organization. This helped us confirm and further refine our argument.  
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Toward a Modular Governance Architecture of Sustainable Practice  
We find that, collectively, the heterogeneous and transnational community of standard-setters has helped 
farmers in diverse geographical contexts implement ‘sustainable practices’ by translating the ambiguous 
notion of sustainability into a set of unequivocal and enforceable standard criteria, technical assistance and 
trainings for farmers. In their role as governance actors, standard-setters not only have the ability to evaluate 
and probe possibilities of putting sustainability into practice, but also to shape the definition and meaning 
of the concept of sustainability for the whole sector. Standard-setters thus are in a position to act as “pace 
setters” who are “pushing the boundaries,” as a Fairtrade licensee argued. 
To do so, however, standard-setters had to address three central governance problems: 1) making sense of 
ambiguous and sometimes controversial sustainability objectives; 2) streamlining and abstracting from 
often idiosyncratic local practice conditions; and 3) dealing with diverse interests and agendas of actors, 
not least amongst their own, highly diverse stakeholder base. We find that transnational standard-setters 
have been able to manage these challenges mainly through a modular governance architecture they have 
collectively contributed to over time. Standard-setters have thereby defined, codified and inter-related 
various governance modules in terms of distinct standard criteria that collectively define the meaning and 
practice of sustainability. This process has not been the result of strategic intent of a central ‘architect’, but 
rather an emergent outcome of the distributed activities and interactions of multiple standard-setters. We 
found this process to be collectively driven, continuous and reciprocal, and informed by particular, often 
module-centered (rather than overarching) interests of standard-setters in the face of an evolving global 
discourse, and local practice adoption. Next, we examine three core processes underlying the emergence 
of the modular governance architecture: experimentation, legitimation and (re-)integration. 
 (1) Local niche experimentation: Creating new governance modules 
One key process through which standard-setters have shaped the meaning of ‘sustainable practice’ has been 
distributed experimentation, which has informed the creation of quasi-separable governance modules. By 
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governance module we mean a bundle of distinct ‘sustainable practices’ (e.g. promotion of Fairtrade 
Minimum Price payment or shade-based coffee growing) which are codified in form of standardized 
requirements listed in a text document commonly referred to as “the standard document.” They are 
accompanied by tangible implementation routines, compliance criteria and auditing protocols. For instance, 
shade-grown coffee is accompanied by technical assistance, farmers’ and workers’ training policies, 
control points and assessment methods. Governance modules thus can, in principle, be pursued relatively 
independently from each other. Through experience, learning and regular revisions, governance modules 
become “more specific and more codified over time,” as a SAN respondent explained, which is regarded 
as “part of the natural evolution of our standard.” As a result of distributed experiments, governance 
modules are established which contribute to the overall governance architecture by codifying and 
formalizing ‘sustainable practice’ across local contexts, and by serving as building blocks that can be 
potentially adopted by multiple standard-setters in different settings.  
Historically, most governance modules emerged from often multiple local niche experiments of different 
standard-setters driven by their particular interests and agendas. In fact, as Fairtrade’s “fair price” or 
Rainforest Alliance’s “shade-grown practices” indicate, most standard-setters initially focused on specific 
and idiosyncratic goals, e.g. establishing a fair price, rather than on standardizing “sustainable practice” as 
a whole. Often, local niche experiments would add new ideas, themes, but also conflict with established 
notions of “sustainability”. In effect, various groups and organizations developed in parallel a number of 
separate core practices that only later got integrated into a collectively recognized modular configuration 
of “sustainable practice”. Yet, certain modules still remain specific to certain standard-setters rather than 
others. For example, given the roots of Fairtrade in the social justice movement, the “Fairtrade Minimum 
Price” has remained the foundational core governance module, even if Fairtrade has expanded its standard 
portfolio over time. Similarly, for Rainforest Alliance, whose initial core objective was to protect the 
rainforest, shade-grown practices, specified as an “overall canopy density on the cultivated land [of] at 
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least 40%” with diverse trees including a minimum of “12 native species per hectare” (SAN, 2008), have 
become a critical standard building block.  
Importantly, new governance modules are established as participants engage in problem-solving activities 
in response to particular interests and concerns. The creation of new government modules in response to 
“new issues that present themselves all the time,” generates “incremental change [in a specific standard] 
over time,” as a Rainforest Alliance explained. The example of Nespresso AAA illustrates this point, which 
describes itself as taking a “dynamic, constantly-evolving approach” (Nespresso, 2015). Nespresso had 
enjoyed growth rates of 20-30% per annum and regarded managing its growth as a strategic challenge since 
the brand relied on a secure supply of the highest quality coffee beans for its premium products (Nespresso, 
2012). “From all the entire coffee in the world only 10% is high quality coffee, but only 1% of the world’s 
coffee is what they were looking for, that had the aromas they wanted,” a Nespresso consultant remembered. 
To incentivize quality, in 2002-03 Nespresso engaged in a series of cross-sector partnership projects with 
the Rainforest Alliance to experiment with quality practices at the farm level. This initially involved two 
coffee suppliers, Ecom and Expocafé, and just 300 farmers in Costa Rica and Columbia. Formalization of 
the initiative from 2005 onwards led to the creation of the “AAA Sustainable Quality” program (‘AA’ 
standing for highest quality coffee, adding a third ‘A’ for sustainability), which covered 63,000 farmers 
across eleven countries by 2015. In cooperation with the Rainforest Alliance, Nespresso selected core 
modules from “the other pillars, so social, economic and environmental issues, but [aimed at] integrating 
quality” as a distinctive building block. Specialized modules “to promote high quality coffee” introduced 
“best practices” in coffee cultivation for shade trees, fertilization, integrated pest management as well as 
tasting kits to help producers evaluate quality of their coffee. 
The creation of additional modules to encourage productivity further indicate the role of experimentation 
and problem-solving activities. Nespresso recognized that securing supply of high quality Arabica coffee 
was a global bottleneck stifling the growth of the brand. “They looked at the statistics and realized that they 
were going to run out of that coffee, because demand is higher than supply,” a Nespresso consultant 
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explained. From 2008 to 2010, Nespresso conducted a study of more than 600 supplier farms in Costa Rica, 
Guatemala, Colombia, Brazil, and Mexico, to better understand the challenges of securing high-quality 
coffee production. Similar to the early Fairtrade pioneers, Nespresso identified lack of income as a key 
problem facing coffee communities, threatening the economic sustainability of coffee farming. Researchers 
concluded that “farmers are generally unprofitable” (Nespresso, 2012, p. 8). An additional problem was the 
ageing population of coffee growers as the younger generations migrated to the cities for better economic 
opportunities. Nespresso (2012, p. 8) warned that it “could reasonably expect large-scale exit of coffee 
producers from coffee-producing zones they depend on for their highest quality coffees.”  
While “in the beginning it was about quality”, the threat to future coffee production made the brand take 
economic sustainability more seriously. In particular, research alerted Nespresso to increase productivity 
and producer revenue. A consultant who had worked on elaborating Nespresso AAA explains: 
 
The study concluded that rather than price, it was “yield”, the amount of coffee produced per hectare, and 
especially the percentage of high quality coffee, that drove producer income. The findings of this research 
project led Nespresso to develop a concept called Real Farmer Income™ where “the main benefit is based 
on productivity improvements” to increase incomes. Real Farmer Income™ got associated with a set of 
governance modules designed to build closer relationships with farmers and tie their benefits to quality and 
productivity improvements. For example, one productivity module that was introduced as part of the 
standard package was the systematic rejuvenation of coffee trees, needed because “many farmers have 
coffee trees that are 20 years old and are not very productive,” a respondent explained.  
(2) Legitimation across local contexts: Negotiating the importance and content of modules  
Nespresso did a lot of research with INCAE [Latin American business school] and what they found 
out, and this is really radical and controversial, is what drives net income is NOT price. It is actually 
productivity and quality. Getting higher pay doesn’t mean you are getting a higher income […] So 
farmers should not be thinking about the premium, but about the bottom line!  
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The ambiguity of sustainability as a concept continues to allow competing definitions of sustainability to 
co-exist and compete; and distributed paths of experimentation have generated multiple solutions that vie 
for adopters. As standard-setters filled the meaning of sustainability goals over time with concrete, 
certifiable rules and criteria, driven by their interests and local practice experimentation, this produced a 
range of governance modules whose sector-wide adoption partly depends on the degree to which they are 
seen as legitimate within the trans-local community of standard-setters and adopters. Highly legitimate 
modules are likely to be adopted by most standard-setters, whereas more controversial modules are offered 
by sub-groups of standard-setters. We also found that standard-setters would converge on the importance 
of certain modules in principle, yet diverge on their concrete interpretation. Table 2 depicts governance 
modules that have become accepted as legitimate ‘core’ elements of sustainability, as well as those that 
remain more or less contested. Below we describe how legitimation processes are contingent on the 
recognition of a matching critical issue in the global discourse and negotiation among peers, which can 
build consensus on the legitimacy of specific governance modules. 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> INSERT TABLE 2 <<<<<<<<<<<<<< 
Reference points in the global discourse. One driver of legitimation across local contexts is the emergence 
of “obligatory passage points,” that is, global institutions that have created key reference points in the global 
sustainability discourse. The notion of “obligatory passage point” refers to the intersection of meanings and 
relations among actors in creating a common frame of reference in a particular field (Latour, 1987; Callon 
1986). To be legitimate, sustainability standards need to cover these (Dingwerth and Pattberg, 2009). To 
illustrate, ILO conventions that are designated as “core labor standards” have become an obligatory passage 
point for the social pillar, promoting ethical norms of universal value across the world. Standard-setters 
have adopted and explicitly reference ILO conventions to legitimize their aspirations to set standards. For 
example, both 4C, UTZ Certified (2010) and SAN/Rainforest Alliance (2011) confirm that the formulation 
of social criteria on labor rights are “based on the international ILO conventions.” Similarly, the consensus 
on “prohibited pesticides lists” shows how global discourse has shaped such agreements. Initially only the 
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organic standard specifically aimed at eliminating pesticides. But with the Stockholm Convention on 
Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) taking effect in 2004, a global treaty requiring parties to take measures 
to eliminate or reduce the release of POPs into the environment, eliminating pesticides has become a priority 
and standard-setters have added “forbidden pesticides lists” to their environmental modules. Such high-
consensus governance modules solidify over time and thus become ‘standard elements of standards’. 
However, they are not imposed by any external party – neither by UN organizations nor by ISEAL or other 
associations. As mentioned earlier, ISEAL does not prescribe to its members what ‘sustainability’ means. 
Rather, certain standard elements, such as ILO ‘core labor standards’ get collectively enacted by standard-
setters as a means to gain legitimacy among stakeholders. Notably, ILO conventions existed long before 
they were ‘adopted’ by sustainability standards. Only more recently, they got incorporated as part of 
‘sustainable practice’. 
To remain legitimate, standard-setters also absorb shifts in the global discourse. For instance, changing 
consumer preferences have led Fairtrade, initially focused on trade justice, to add modules addressing 
environmental issues. A Fairtrade respondent reported that the fact that “there is now more concern about 
the environment and global warming…has been translated into our standards.” The way in which standard-
setters have responded to the global discourse of climate change by developing climate change mitigation 
modules illustrates how global discourse and peer pressure stimulate standard-setting activities. Fairtrade 
(2015) has developed a Fairtrade Carbon Credits module as an “add on” to the existing standard. Similarly, 
Rainforest Alliance reported that “the Sustainable Agriculture Network has developed a climate change 
module, a voluntary module. This probably has to be more formalized into the standard when they do the 
next round of changes in about three years time [due to be published in 2016].”  
Negotiating the content of modules – the example of economic benefits. Some modules continue to be 
controversial, even if there is consensus on their importance in principle. We illustrate that with the concrete 
specification of ‘economic benefits’ for farmers by Fairtrade and Nespresso. As a pioneer standard, 
Fairtrade had claimed moral authority over defining economic benefit as the payment of a “fair" price. 
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Fairtrade thus pioneered a “fair price” module in 1989 to empower small-holder farmers in addition to pre-
financing, long-term contracts and a developmental premium (US$ 1,40/lb + US$ 0,2/lb for washed Arabica 
since 2011). Other standards have disputed the political rationale – trade justice – behind Fairtrade’s ‘fair 
price’, while retaining the idea that farmers should benefit economically. For example, despite paying a 
price premium of 10% - 15% above the market price for high quality coffees, Nespresso was reluctant to 
adopt the Fairtrade standard. Nespresso lamented that Fairtrade “didn’t have a good association with quality 
[…] people bought it for charitable reasons,” as a Nespresso consultant explained. 
However, in response to Fairtrade and in an attempt to gain further legitimacy as sustainability standards, 
industry-driven standards soon developed their own income modules. For example, Nespresso’s in-house 
module “Real Farmers’ Income” sounded similar to Fairtrade’s fair price and shared the same aim of 
benefitting farmers, yet used a fundamentally different approach. Instead of guaranteeing price premiums 
(a duty of the buyer), this module promoted higher productivity and better quality (a duty of the producer). 
This re-interpretations of the meaning of economic sustainability was more driven by standard-setters as 
self-named representatives of producers than producers themselves. “What they [farmers] are interested in 
is the premium,” as a Nespresso researcher admitted.  
The focus on quality and productivity improvements chimed well with mainstream Western buyers, who 
had long since questioned Fairtrade for subsidizing “inefficient farmers who produce poor quality goods” 
(Sidwell, 2008, p. 13). It also aligned better with the interests of other standard-setters, who maintained 
that prices should be “freely negotiated between the individual buyer and seller” (4C, 2010) yet often faced 
a legitimacy deficit vis-à-vis Fairtrade for not addressing “the unfairness of global markets” and price 
volatility. With the exception of Fairtrade, standard-setters collectively converged on the idea that farmers’ 
lack of productivity was the key economic challenge, as a respondent from SAN/Rainforest Alliance 
confirmed: “One of the main problems is that there are extremely unproductive people, I mean, really!” 
Another SAN/Rainforest Alliance added:  
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While “productivity and quality are not yet part of our standards,” Rainforest Alliance confirmed that “we 
are working towards that on a project basis, to elaborate a new module to codify what people need to do to 
produce good coffee, like pruning and rejuvenation of the coffee plants, all these agronomic practices.”  
With this shift towards quality and productivity as part of economic sustainability, Fairtrade came under 
increasing pressure to also address productivity. Most respondents regarded the Fairtrade Minimum Price 
as the defining module that the organization “won’t give up on,” as Fairtrade’s CEO insisted. Fairtrade 
resisted reducing the association of the economic pillar with higher price – not least to protect its own 
identity and the label’s unique selling point. A focus on productivity conflicted with the initially envisioned 
power shift from Northern buyers to Southern producers. A respondent from Cafedirect, a Fairtrade coffee 
roaster, lamented that productivity did not contribute “to have a power shift, right? To shift more value 
down the value chain to producers and distribute risk more equally than is currently the case in the 
conventional market.” Fairtrade respondents agreed that “efficiency could be contrary to sustainability. I 
find it risky to over-emphasize efficiency as part of sustainability.” But under increasing pressure from 
buyers to justify premium price payments, Fairtrade (2011) started to earmark 25% of social premium for 
investments in productivity and quality, acknowledging that “improving productivity and quality is key to 
increase producers’ income and ensure the supply of high quality coffee in the long term.”  
This partial re-definition of “economic benefits” as productivity rather than fair prices illustrates how a 
negotiation arena gets defined over time through interactions among standard-setters at the modular level. 
It helps standard-setters reach agreements on general objectives, while leaving scope for divergent 
interpretations that accommodate the specific interests of individual standard-setters, quite independent of 
the interests and needs of producers. 
Everybody talks about ‘what is the premium’? I think this is a misleading discussion. Of course our 
certified coffee is sold at a premium, but we don’t think this is the most important thing. The most 
important thing for the farmer is that the farmer improves practices, and becomes more 
professional, and also more productive […] But this is something that insiders understand, but the 
public doesn’t understand.  
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(3) (Re-)Integrating modules into an emerging governance architecture  
Whereas initially, various objectives, such as the omission of pesticides (organic), fair prices (Fairtrade), 
shade farming (Rainforest Alliance) or quality (Nespresso) were promoted rather independently, they have 
become modular building blocks within an emerging transnational governance architecture promoting the 
pursuit of a unifying goal – “sustainable practice”. Standard-setters have thereby begun to regard each other 
as participants in a joint transnational arena, characterized by similar objectives. Below we describe how 
such (re-) integration processes, in particular the ordering of modules along the triple bottom line and the 
grouping of modules as basic and advanced, have helped coordination among standard-setters. They also 
helped uncover interdependencies between modules whose recognition has led to greater reflexivity among 
standard-setters about the contribution of modules to overall sustainability objectives.  
Ordering governance modules along the triple bottom line. A key driver for re-integration of governance 
modules into a coherent meaning system was the notion of the “triple bottom line” that conceptually linked 
the three pillars of sustainability, which was introduced by the 1987 Brundtland report “Our Common 
Future” and has increasingly been promoted by the global policy discourse. Importantly, the triple bottom 
line has not clarified what sustainability ‘is’. Rather, it has served as a ‘grouping device’ for standard-setters, 
as a symbolic orientation for mutual observation and comparison. Evidence of the adoption of the triple 
bottom line can be found in the layout of standard documents, where criteria are organized under headings 
of the social, economic and environmental pillar. Moreover, criteria related to each of the pillars are 
typically treated as separate work packages. 
As standard-setters became confronted with each other in a growing market for sustainable coffee, they 
started to compare each other using the triple bottom line as a benchmarking device. This helped standard-
setters categorize their own governance modules into the three pillars of social equity, environmental 
quality and economic prosperity, but also identify “gaps” which might call into question their legitimacy 
as a sustainability standard. Fairtrade thus added and refined environmental modules while Rainforest 
Alliance and Organic added social ones. Over time sophisticated benchmarking tools assisted comparison 
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between standards. For instance, Fairtrade started to develop internal benchmarking tools in 2007 and 
refined them in 2008/09 to better understand and track differences and similarities with other standards. 
Since the late 2000s, a range of benchmarking studies and tools emerged to help consumers and potential 
adopters navigate through the “jungle” of standards. For instance, the International Trade Centre has 
developed a web tool allowing users to identify and review different supply chain standards and compare 
their social, environmental, economic and quality requirements (see http://www.standardsmap.org/).  
While the ISEAL Alliance has played a critical role in aligning its members under a common umbrella, the 
notion of the triple bottom line has provided the common language needed to align formerly disconnected 
goals. Rather than being only “fair” or “green”, settling on a common way of clustering governance modules 
encouraged standard-setters to see each other as pursuing a shared goal: “At the end of the day, you are 
talking about the same problems that we are trying to solve in different ways to different extents […] Soil 
erosion, whatever program you are talking about, the problem is the same” (Rainforest Alliance).  
Grouping governance modules as ‘basic’ and ‘advanced’. Competing standards faced increasing criticism 
for lack of coherence and exploding costs for producers, who often had to adopt more than one standard 
and pay for multiple certifications to sell their coffee to different buyers. To tackle this issue, we found that 
in particular second-generation standards played a critical role in promoting step-by-step adoption of 
sustainable practice by differentiating ‘basic’ modules, which can be implemented upfront, and ‘advanced’, 
more flexible modules, which follow later. 4C illustrates this process. Sponsored by mainstream coffee 
roasters, 4C wanted to develop an entry-level baseline standard by ‘eliminating worst practices’ rather than 
innovate new modules. To identify the most basic components of sustainability, 4C’s initiating stakeholders 
engaged in a search process along the triple bottom line whereby they assessed which modules should be 
considered ‘baseline.’ A 4C representative remembered how they compared “the standards of Fairtrade, 
organic, UTZ Certified, SAN/Rainforest Alliance, Starbucks’ C.A.F.E. Practices […] and sorted them 
according to economic, social and environmental dimensions […]. And then our stakeholders discussed 
what we considered as really unacceptable practices that should be excluded in 4C.” Under pressure from 
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ISEAL to demonstrate added value as a new standard, 4C established a ‘baseline’ configuration of modules 
which could be recombined with modules from other standards. 4C collaborated with Fairtrade, UTZ 
Certified and the Rainforest Alliance to create an entry level package that provided a step-up approach to 
compliance towards more demanding standards. According to the same principle, many standards today 
group their own offerings into basic and advanced modules to, on the one hand, facilitate adoption by 
farmers with a different degree of readiness or preparation for certification, and, on the other hand, stimulate 
endorsements from other standards, which further drives down certification costs. One good example is the 
collaboration between Nespresso AAA and Rainforest Alliance (CRECE, 2013).   
Reflecting on interdependencies between governance modules. Converting the notion of sustainability into 
a rather loose set of governance modules along the triple bottom line has allowed standard-setters to 
negotiate concrete sustainable practices independently of each other without having to operationalize the 
overarching goal of “sustainability”. Yet, on the ground, governance modules are highly interdependent. 
Our data suggests that such sometimes unforeseen interdependencies are typically discovered when 
modules are enacted in local settings. These observations have been an important driver of learning and 
reflexivity of the emerging modular architecture of sustainability in practice. 
One example is the relationship between environmental and economic benefits of shade-grown coffee, one 
of Rainforest Alliance’s core modules. A SAN/Rainforest Alliance respondent explained how shade-grown 
coffee may also increase quality and crop resilience while reducing costs, thus raising incomes:  
 
Putting in shade is something that can be done. It is not the most difficult, not even the most 
expensive change. Sometimes mentally it is a big change for the farmers, because they fear that 
their productivity will go down, which is probably true. But then we argue that their quality often 
will go up, and their needs for agrochemical products will go down, so they will have a cheaper 
production system. They will also have a risk of fewer diseases because you go from a 
monoculture to a more diversified agro-forestry production system which is more robust and 
resilient, which is not a big risk to get all sorts of diseases as in a mono-culture, plus reduce the 
risk of soil erosion, which will raise their productivity in the long run. 
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However, these interdependencies have to be carefully calibrated. A respondent from Rainforest Alliance 
explained how this may lead to trade-offs, depending on context-specific factors, such as local climate and 
vegetation: 
 
Hence, conservation efforts may be at odds with objectives of productivity gains and higher yields needed 
to ensure effective land use. The need to strike a careful balance between productivity and ecological quality 
was an insight that arose from knowing the conditions on the ground, rather than from the global discourse, 
as a Rainforest Alliance informant explained: 
 
Productivity improvements themselves could be seen as a critical conservation strategy, as a 
SAN/Rainforest Alliance respondent explained: 
 
To address these tensions and the complexities arising from interdependencies between modules as they 
get implemented in practice, standards have begun to add flexibility to the implementation of modules 
without giving up on the importance of ‘having each module’ as part of a coherent system. SAN/Rainforest 
Alliance, for example, modified its ‘shade growing’ criteria. In the old standard, one requirement was to 
preserve at least 12 native tree species and at least 70 trees per hectare; now it changed to an average of 12 
native tree species, with no minimum number of trees per hectare. Also, previous criteria stated a minimum 
You might have farmers in Peru who basically grow coffee right there in the forest, and they might 
have 70% shade. […] So that means they hardly produce any coffee, so they are poor, and they 
have the incentive to expand their coffee growing area. […] and sometimes the right approach is 
actually to chop down some of your shade if you can give the man a good productivity in return. 
I worked in UN Development Programme – and many of my former colleagues would say ‘how 
can you suggest them to chop down the shade?’ But you need to make it possible and even 
attractive to be a coffee farmer. Even for the next generation. Nowadays people don’t want to be 
farmers. The young generation is moving to the cities. And I think fundamentalists they miss that, 
they don’t capture that […] these are complicated issues that are difficult to put in a slogan. 
We as a conservation organization we are very cognizant of the risk if people don’t use the land 
that they have in a sustainable way and really maximize the use of it, then we will run out of land. 
And where will they take the land from? So this will clearly come from the remaining rainforested 
areas, and we lose the remaining natural areas that we have on earth.  
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of 40% shade cover, now the standard specifies this minimum only on cultivated land. This shows how 
governance modules get adjusted as they are incorporated into a dynamically changing modular 
architecture. A Rainforest Alliance representative explains: Land use “needs to be as effective as possible, 
but in a sustainable way…and I think fundamentalists miss that, they don’t capture that complexity.”  
 
Discussion: Governing Sustainability Transitions Through a Modular Architecture 
Above we examined how transnational standard-setters have defined and promoted ‘sustainable practice’ 
across the global coffee sector by collectively building a modular governance architecture. Modularity 
enables cumulative standardization and implementation of ‘sustainable practice’ across local contexts, 
while providing space for the negotiation and addition of new building blocks. This architecture is 
composed of an evolving set of quasi-independent governance modules, e.g. ‘banning of pesticides’, 
‘shade-growing’ and ‘producer income’, and interfaces between modules, e.g. distinctions and 
interrelations between ‘basic’ and ‘advanced’ modules. Through this modular architecture, which continues 
to evolve, and the ongoing creation and negotiation of governance modules, standard-setters have 
collectively managed to lower the ambiguity of the ongoing global sustainability discourse; increase the 
utility of local niche experiments and experiences; and facilitate coordination among multiple actors with 
partly conflicting interests and agendas. Our notion of a modular governance architecture specifies the 
emergence and utility of an important structural dimension – modularity – as part of ‘participatory 
architectures’ (Ferraro et al., 2015) that allow diverse and heterogeneous actors within global transition 
networks to interact constructively. This facilitates ‘experimentalist governance’ (Sabel and Zeitlin, 2012) 
in sustainability transitions, in particular in transnational domains, like the global coffee sector. 
 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> INSERT FIGURE 1 <<<<<<<<<<<< 
Based on our empirical findings, Figure 1 displays key processes in which transnational standard-setters 
engage. In combination, they have contributed to the emergence of a modular governance architecture: 
creating new governance modules (experimentation); negotiating the content of modules with peers 
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(legitimation); and creating modular interfaces within an emerging governance architecture (re-integration). 
These processes happen at the global-local intersection of socio-technical transitions (Geels, 2004; Coenen 
et al., 2012) as they are informed by both global discourse, policies and transnational communities, and 
local producer contexts. They are also driven by the particular agendas of standard-setters which are both 
enabled and constrained by the global discourse: they are enabled by the multi-vocality of sustainability as 
a concept and the proliferation of private governance initiatives (Eberlein et al., 2014), and they are 
constrained by the need of standard-setters to legitimize their role as governance actors and rule-making 
organizations (Dingwerth and Pattberg, 2009). Importantly, while standard-setters engage in these 
processes quite intentionally and strategically, in support of their own agendas, the resulting governance 
architecture is a collective, rather unintentional, outcome of reciprocal interactions rather than the product 
of a ‘central architect’ (see also below). Next, we discuss the process in greater detail. 
First, standard-setters have been engaged in niche experimentation with sustainable practices in local 
production contexts that has led to the creation of new governance modules, e.g. fair prices, elimination of 
pesticides, shade growing practices – initially to pursue their own objectives, and later to complement other 
modules. A governance module is defined by a ‘sustainability’-related objective, pursued rather 
independently through concrete sets of techniques and processes which can be certified, monitored and 
evaluated. The creation of a (new) module is a result of the interplay of aggregate findings from local 
experiments (e.g. the need to enhance farmers’ productivity) and specific agendas of standard-setters (e.g. 
industry’s interest in securing long terms supply of quality coffee). They are also informed by frames in the 
global discourse (e.g. the now widely accepted notion of ‘economic sustainability’). 
Second, standard-setters have been engaged in legitimation processes by negotiating the content of modules 
with peers across local contexts through matching criteria in the global discourse. Whereas diversity 
encourages parallel experimentation (Coenen et al., 2012), it poses a challenge to coherence of practices 
across the sector. Negotiations between standard-setters, e.g. about the meaning of ‘producer benefits’, 
often result in agreements on the importance of modules in principle while leaving room for variations in 
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how the actual content of modules is formulated and implemented by standard-setters. The modular 
approach allows for such flexibility, whereby ‘flexibility’ is also constrained by boundaries of legitimacy. 
Such boundaries are also set by global policies and discourses producing norms and prescriptions of 
‘sustainable’ practice (e.g. consensus on the need to abolish the worst pesticides). Certain modules thus 
become institutionalized in principle across standard-setters as critical sustainability elements, while 
negotiations of specifications of modules are ongoing – guided by interests and agendas of standard-setters, 
changes in the global discourse and experiences on the ground . Importantly, over time, standard modules 
become more than just ‘individual’ offerings of standard-setters, without necessarily being 100% 
harmonized across standards in all their specifications. 
Third, standard-setters have been engaged in (re-) integrating governance modules into an emerging 
architecture that reflects the overarching objective of sustainability transition. This process is informed by 
institutional expectations from the global governance discourse (Eberlein et al., 2014; Dingwerth and 
Pattberg, 2009) and meta-organizations such as ISEAL (Loconto and Foullieux, 2014). Certain themes from 
the global discourse, such as the triple bottom line, have thereby served as templates to guide this integration 
process. Integration happens through the creation of multiple interfaces: First, standard-setters categorize 
modules as part of one of the three pillars – economic, environmental and social – and thereby legitimize 
their contribution to the overarching goal of sustainability. Second, through negotiation processes, modules 
get categorized over time as ‘basic’ or ‘advanced’, which helps solidify ‘standard elements of standards’ in 
a cumulative way and which stimulates endorsements of offerings across standards, such as Rainforest 
Alliances and Nespresso AAA. Based on this ordering principle, which is also informed by implementation 
challenges in practice as well as pressures to lower certification costs for farmers, ‘advanced’ modules can 
(or should) only be implemented once ‘basic’ modules are in place. Third, reintegration involves the 
continuous evaluation of potential interdependencies of different governance modules on the ground, e.g. 
implementing shade-grown practices and promoting productivity. This has led to increasing reflexivity as 
to the contribution of particular modules to the overarching goal of greater sustainability. 
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The emerging modular governance architecture has helped standard-setters manage the complexity arising 
from the ambiguity of sustainability objectives, the idiosyncrasy of niche experiments, and the multiplicity 
of governance actors. To some extent, the modular governance architecture we observe in the global coffee 
sector resembles modular designs of complex products and systems that have been studied previously 
(Henderson and Clark, 1990; Garud and Kumaraswamy, 1995; Sanchez, 1995; Sanchez and Mahoney, 
1996). In these contexts, modularity describes the degree to which interfaces between system components 
are specified in such a way that they can be operated with minimized coordination, thus mitigating 
complexity (Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Baldwin, 2008; Ethiraj and Levinthal, 2004). The principle of 
modularity has also been applied to conceptualize division of labor and parallel distributed work and 
innovation within open collaborative systems (Baldwin and Hippel 2011; Fjeldstad et al., 2012). Similarly, 
modularity allows multiple standard-setters with different agendas to contribute to sustainability transitions 
as a complex and collective undertaking.  
However, the modular governance architecture we observe here also differs from previous accounts of 
‘modular architectures’ in two major ways. First, whereas the previously studied modular architectures are 
typically ‘designed’ to be modular, i.e. products, firms and collaborative systems are intentionally 
modularized to facilitate innovation and improvement (see e.g. Henderson and Clark, 1990; Baldwin and 
Hippel, 2011), there is typically no ‘central architect’ in the context of transnational sustainability 
transitions. In fact, one key challenge has been distributed governance over a multiplicity of actors – here: 
standard-setters – with partly conflicting goals and interests. We showed that individual standard-setters 
started out with specifying their own offerings before gradually entering mutual observation, imitation and 
negotiation that would eventually promote an emerging modular governance architecture. The growing 
consensus on the triple bottom line of sustainability was an important ‘event’ in the global discourse that 
stimulated standard-setters to align distinct building blocks within a common architecture. Yet, it is an open 
question whether such an architecture will be promoted more proactively in other sectors. 
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Second, and relatedly, whereas in technology development, particular modules are typically derived from 
decomposing established processes and systems (Sinha and Van de Ven, 2005; Zhou, 2013), in our case, 
such a ‘system’ did not exist in the first place. Instead, standard-setters have engaged in ‘adding’ new 
modules to an evolving sustainability agenda, whose interfaces with other – existing – modules are 
negotiated over time. Thus, ‘system (re-) integration’ is not about specifying all interfaces between modules 
(Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Baldwin, 2008; Ethiraj and Levinthal, 2004), but about gradually promoting 
‘systemness’ (Giddens, 1979) through step-by-step definition of interfaces and interrelations between 
modules. This way, the overall governance process has been rather flexible and adaptable, accounting for 
continuous learning from local experimentation, and an evolving global sustainability discourse. This 
reflects the fact that, compared to technological transitions (Geels, 2002), sustainability transitions are much 
more political, intangible and open to re-interpretation (Shove and Walker, 2007). However, we also 
observed processes of solidifying modules as ‘basic building blocks’ which, in combination, constitute a 
rather stable ‘platform’ based on which standard-setters continue to add new modules. This relates to the 
fact that sustainability standards are also linked to technologies in a broader sense, e.g. particular farming 
practices and quality control tools, whose implementation can be rather path-dependent as it lowers the cost 
of adding compatible modules, while making it costly to switch to entirely different systems (Brunsson et 
al., 2012; Garud and Kumaraswamy, 1993).    
 
Implications 
Our findings make two major contributions to the literature. They help (1) elaborate modularity as a 
mechanism of managing sector-wide sustainability transitions, in particular in transnational domains; and 
(2) point to dynamics of meaning-making in sustainability transition processes.  
First, we contribute to our understanding of transitions management (Kemp et al., 2007; Raven et al., 2010), 
by showing how modularity can help mitigate key challenges in sustainability transitions (Shove and 
Walker, 2007; Voss et al., 2007). To begin with, modular governance is a critical mechanism through which 
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the tension between the need for both generic and concrete adaptable solutions (Brunsson et al., 2012) can 
be managed, in particular in transnational domains (see also Grunwald, 2000). We thus see modularity as 
an important facilitator of what Sabel and Zeitlin (2012) call ‘experimentalist governance’, which becomes 
particularly relevant in tackling complex – highly interdependent, uncertain and ambiguous – challenges, 
such as sustainability (Ferraro et al., 2015). While the role of modularity in managing complexity has been 
examined mostly in technological innovation (Henderson and Clark, 1990; Ethiraj and Levinthal, 2004; 
Baldwin and Hippel 2011; Fjeldstad et al., 2012) and technological transitions (e.g. Gawer, 2014), we show 
that modularity can also be a “rich entry point into a broader set of issues cutting across technological 
organizational and strategic domains” (Garud et al., 2009, p. 7). But in contrast to technological systems, 
the modular architecture we observe seems more open, flexible and emergent. Governance architectures 
seem to be systems ‘in-the-making’ – similar to infrastructures, which are “fundamentally relational” (Star 
1999, p. 80) and provide interfaces for extensions and refinements. They might never be ‘complete’, but 
they adapt to changing agendas and experiences (see also Kemp et al., 2007). This also reflects more recent 
notions of ‘governance’ in sustainability transitions as continual and ongoing “systems of practice” – “the 
emergent outcome […] of interacting and co-evolving practices [rather] than […] the knowable products 
of policy intervention” (Shove and Walker, 2010, p. 472). In fact, “effective intervention may lie in the 
generation and circulation of elements of which variously sustainable practices are made” (p. 472). Modular 
governance architectures account for this need of continuous adaptation of sustainable practice.  
Moreover, the benefit of a modular governance architecture goes beyond promoting adaptability of 
‘sustainable practice’ across time and space. It also reduces ambiguity around the goal of sustainability and 
helps mitigate conflicting interests among governance actors – a particular problem in sustainability 
transitions whose objectives are less tangible than technological transitions. For example, while participants 
are unlikely to agree on all dimensions of sustainability, they are likely to agree on some. Modular 
governance approaches help develop and sustain “provisional settlement” (Girard and Stark 2002, p. 153) 
or a “working consensus” on which modules are important. Thereby, modular governance processes in 
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support of rather intangible, yet often highly controversial objectives, such as sustainability, are less 
constrained by concerns for ‘compatibility’ and ‘efficiency’ between/across modules than for example 
technological standards, systems, and infrastructures. Our findings suggest that emerging governance 
architectures are much more a product of ongoing political negotiations and agenda-setting. Relatedly, 
governance modules as part of a modular governance architecture may vary in the degree to which they are 
specified as well as in the range of co-existing alternative specifications, reflecting different, sometimes 
conflicting interests of governance actors. Yet, even if modules vary in specification, the overall modular 
approach can lower the potential risk of stagnation in sustainability transitions due to goal ambiguity or 
conflicting interests (Banerjee, 2003; Hoffman and Bazerman, 2007; Levy and Lichtenstein, 2011; Newig 
et al., 2007). For example, under the umbrella of climate change, various carbon offset initiatives have 
emerged and now co-exist (Hoffman, 2011). They allow the implementation of climate-friendly practices 
by various actors who have reached settlement on the meaningfulness of carbon offset programs, and thus 
also support a growing consensus around climate change as an ‘issue’. Thus, modular governance 
architectures can help channel governance processes often over longer periods of time, such that consensual 
goals can be pursued while controversial ones are delayed or re-framed.  
Our findings also help elaborate the role and implications of distributed agency in sustainability transitions 
(Shove and Walker, 2007; Rip, 2006), focusing on interactions amongst multiple standard-setters as 
governance actors. Here, the agency to implement policy and governance objectives is distributed across 
decentralized – both competing and collaborating – actors (Sørensen 2006, Rasche 2010). More than 
previous studies on transitions management (e.g. Kemp et al., 2007; Raven et al., 2010), we discuss the 
operational challenges arising from distributed agency and control over the process. We show that standard-
setters are neither merely ‘agents of change’ on behalf of others, e.g. policy-makers (Kivimaa, 2014), nor 
do they simply pursue ‘their’ own interest and agendas in sustainability transition processes (Newig et al., 
2007; Shove and Walker, 2007; Voss et al., 2007). Rather, our findings suggest how governance processes 
of standard-setters are influenced by global discourse dynamics, recurrent local experimentation, and the 
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standard-setters’ own specific interests and agendas vis-à-vis their peers. Increasing interaction of standard-
setters, partly promoted by the meta-organization ISEAL (Loconto and Fouilleux, 2014), has stimulated a 
modular governance process that has enabled coordination and mutual endorsements, and allowed 
adjustments of standards elements to a variety of local practice conditions. Arguably, the emerging modular 
structure is participatory in that it enables governance architectures to accommodate for multiple and 
changing participants (Ferraro et al., 2015), and enables these divergent actors to cooperatively govern 
sustainability transitions in the absence of an overarching authority. This process thereby increases the 
collective governance capacity of standard-setters, including their capacity to learn (see also Bos et al., 
2013) and upscale solutions from local experiments (Raven et al., 2010), as well as their ability to combine 
long-term strategic orientation with pragmatic incremental change (Kemp et al., 2007).  
In this regard, a modular governance approach may also promote reflexivity in sustainability transitions, in 
terms of the ability to monitor and evaluate consequences of action and incorporate learning processes into 
future interventions (Voss et al., 2007; Shove and Walker, 2007; Smith and Stirling, 2007). Prior research 
has indicated the importance of continuous learning, to promote upscaling and to lower the risk of 
‘disjointed incrementalism’ (Lindblom, 1959). Yet, at what level reflexivity can be realistically promoted 
has been less clear, in particular since the capacity of governance actors to be mindful of their actions is 
limited (Rip, 2006; Giddens, 1984). We suggest that, while ‘local learning’ is still important (see Bos et al., 
2013; Perez-Aleman, 2011), reflexivity at the transnational sector level is as critical. However, we show 
that reflexivity, e.g. related to the consequences of shade-grown or the antecedents of farmers’ benefits, 
seems to be promoted mainly through ‘modular learning processes’, which includes learning about the 
functioning of a module in practice as well as the importance of interfaces between modules, e.g. shade-
grown (environmental pillar) and productivity (economic pillars).  
Second, our study contributes to our understanding of meaning-making in sustainability transitions. In 
particular, we are able to shift emphasis from a prior focus on meaning-making in local contexts of practice 
implementation (Shove and Walker, 2010; Perez-Aleman, 2011) to neglected processes of meaning-making 
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across local contexts within trans-local transition networks. Our findings help understand how multi-vocal 
meta-concepts (Ansell, 2011), such as ‘sustainability’, gain meaning ‘in use’ by being enacted and 
embedded in social practice (see in general, Wittgenstein, 1997; Schatzki, 1997), by showing how local 
lessons are aggregated into more generic and transferrable ‘governance modules’ which are constituted and 
negotiated beyond particular, territorialized implementation contexts. Unlike locally embedded practice, 
governance modules and the meaning they embody are in a state of continuous translation, informed by 
intermediaries who “reflect in action” (Yanow and Tsoukas, 2009). Meanings thereby emerge 
‘collaboratively’ (Tsoukas, 2009) across contexts, whereby heterogeneous actors maintain a going concern 
around overarching goals. As a result, the very meaning of sustainability keeps evolving – not only at the 
level of global discourse, but the increasingly important sector level. Meaning thereby gets constructed in 
a modular, rather than holistic fashion, as multiple actors negotiate the content of governance modules. This 
has important implications for other concepts of transnational governance, such as diversity, poverty 
alleviation, gender equity etc. Future research thus needs to further investigate meaning-making processes 
in various, more or less interrelated transnational domains over time.  
In particular, our study suggests how multi-vocality in meaning-making processes, i.e. the notion that 
“artifacts are interpretively flexible” (Ferraro et al. 2015, p. 375), may be dealt with. In line with other 
studies, our findings show that “meaning is not inherent to an artifact, but is constituted through an ecology 
of interactions between actors” and that not least “the concept of ‘sustainable development’ provides an 
example of multivocal inscription” (p. 375) (see also Ansell, 2011). However, whereas the role of multi-
vocality in inviting a diversity of actors into meaning-making processes has been understood (see e.g. 
Banerjee 2003, Hoffman and Bazerman 2007), we add to this body of literature by showing how multi-
vocality is collectively ‘managed’ in a modular fashion allowing to balance the need for interpretive 
flexibility and a workable consensus on the boundaries of that flexibility. For example, while there is 
ongoing ambiguity around what ‘economic sustainability’ means, we show that the emerging consensus on 
the need for addressing ‘economic benefits for farmers’ as part of that dimension establishes a “container” 
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for meaning-making processes. Through such “containers”, interpretive processes get filtered as more or 
less relevant and meaningful. In other words, we add the idea that modularity gives meaning-making 
processes an overall direction, while still allowing for a certain spectrum of interpretations.  
Our findings also have important implications for policy-making. First, they indicate that standard-setters 
take an increasingly important role not only in implementing – both domestic and global – policies towards 
promoting sustainability transitions (see also Kivimaa, 2014), but in making sense of policy objectives vis-
à-vis both global and local stakeholders. In this regard, policy-makers need to be aware that, more than ever, 
corporate actors will participate in these governance processes and thereby try to gain ownership in 
ambiguous policy arenas, such as sustainability. Second, our findings imply that a modular governance 
approach at the level of policy-making may in fact reduce ambiguity facing implementing actors on the 
ground and also facilitate negotiation processes. Building modularity into policy instruments may be useful 
to accommodate multiple actors and encourage their local experimentation while being able to steer the 
overall process. A modular approach also helps evaluate the effectiveness of specific policies independently 
from other objectives and helps, over time, build reflexivity at the policy level. Governance modules that 
prove to be ineffective or counter-productive may be more flexibly changed than abandoning an entire 
policy mechanism. Third, and relatedly, they may help narrow the gap between sustainability-related 
policies and experiences of ‘sustainable practice’ on the ground. A modular approach may help ‘break down’ 
policies into feasible entry modules vis-a-vis more ‘advanced’ objectives, as a result of negotiations with 
experts on the ground, and thus help better manage the complexity of sustainability transitions.  
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table 1: Standards Overview 
 
 
  
Standard-
setter 
AAA 
Sustainabl
e Quality 
4C 
Association 
Starbucks 
C.A.F.E. 
Practices 
Fairtrade Organic Rainforest 
Alliance 
UTZ 
Certified  
Main 
Objective 
Secure the 
future 
supply of 
the highest 
quality 
coffee. 
Baseline 
standard to 
eliminate 
worst 
practices. 
Reward 
high-quality 
sustainably 
grown 
coffee. 
Seek an 
alternative 
approach to 
conventional 
trade. De-
velopment/ 
Poverty 
alleviation. 
Promote a 
production 
system that 
sustains the 
health of 
soils, eco-
systems and 
people. 
Conserve 
biodiversit
y and 
ensure 
sustainable 
livelihoods. 
Sustainable 
farming and 
better op-
portunities 
for farmers, 
families and 
our planet. 
Compliant 
Coffee pro-
duced 2012 
247,114 
MT 
 
1,782,058 
MT 
457,339 MT 430,000 MT 248,767 MT 348,793 
MT 
715,648 MT 
% of global 
production 
(40% total) 
3% 22% 6% 5% 3% 4% 9% 
Target 
Group 
High-
quality 
coffee 
growers 
All coffee 
producers  
High-quality 
coffee 
growers 
Smallholder 
producers 
All coffee 
producers  
All coffee 
producers  
All coffee 
producers 
Standard 
Launch 
2003 2004/2007 1995 1988/9 1972 1995 1997 
Initiator Firm 
(Nespresso
) 
Governme
nt/ 
Industry 
Firm 
(Starbucks) 
Social 
Movement/ 
NGO 
Social 
Movement/ 
NGO 
Social 
Movement
/ NGO 
Firm (Ahold 
Coffee 
company)  
Initiated in Switzerland Germany USA Netherlands/
Mexico 
Germany USA Netherlands 
Monitoring/ 
Labeling 
Verification 
only 
Verification 
only 
Verification 
only 
Certification 
+ Label 
Certification 
+ Label 
Certificatio
n + Label 
Certification 
+ Label 
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Table 2: Consensual and Contested Governance modules among Standard-Setters 
 
 
  
 Consensual modules Changes to 
consensual/contested 
Contested modules 
E
n
v
ir
o
n
m
e
n
ta
l 
 
Abolishment of ‘banned 
pesticides’  
Reduction in agrochemical use 
Cutting of primary forest or 
destruction of other forms of 
natural resources that are 
designated by national and/ or 
international legislation 
Soil conservation practices 
Water conservation & wastewater 
management 
 Land clearing restrictions 
 Conservation of biodiversity 
 Abolishment of ALL pesticides 
and fertilizers (Chemical-free 
agricultural production) (Organic, 
Bird friendly) 
 Carbon sequestration 
 Energy conservation 
Shade-grown practices (Bird 
Friendly, SAN/Rainforest 
Alliance) 
Prevent/remedy soil erosion and 
water salinization (Organic)  
Ban on GMO (Organic, Bird 
Friendly, Fairtrade, 
SAN/Rainforest Alliance) 
Ecosystem and wildlife 
preservation 
Organic seed and plant materials 
S
o
c
ia
l 
ILO Core Conventions: (1) 
Freedom of association and right 
to collective bargaining; (2) 
Elimination of all forms of forced 
or compulsory labor; (3) Effective 
abolition of child labor; (4) 
Elimination of discrimination in  
employment / occupation 
Access to safe drinking water at 
work; Legal minimum wage & 
working hours; Occupational 
health and safety  
 Local community development 
 Access to basic education for 
children 
 Adequate housing if required 
(ILO 110) 
 
 
Social premium (Fairtrade) 
Living wage 
Majority of producers are small 
farmers (Fairtrade) 
Democracy, participation, and 
transparency in farm 
organization (Fairtrade) 
E
c
o
n
o
m
ic
 
Economic empowerment (market 
access, information, commercial 
training) 
Immoral transactions in business 
relations according to 
international covenants, national 
law and practices (OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises and UN Convention 
on Contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods) 
 Improved product quality 
 Traceability of coffee / Chain 
of Custody 
 Producer income and 
profitability 
 Business opportunities 
(market access, technical 
assistance) 
 Premium price for farmers 
Monitoring of coffee quality (4C, 
UTZ Certified, Starbucks, e.g. 
Starbuck’s beans required to 
have a screen size > 15 mm with 
consistent color and zero 
defects) 
Guaranteed minimum price 
(Fairtrade) 
Business opportunities (Pre-
financing by buyers) (Fairtrade) 
Im
p
le
m
e
n
ta
ti
o
n
 
‘Credible’ monitoring  
Traceability 
Farmer training through 
intermediaries (e.g. traders, 
agronomists) 
 Step-up process of 
certification 
 Impact assessment (e.g. 
COSA cost-benefit analysis; 
ISEAL Impacts Code) 
 Continuous improvements 
(e.g. varying timelines for 
compliance) 
Third-party certification  
ISO 65 accreditation for certifiers 
Minimum conversion (organic, 
e.g. 18 months) 
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Figure 1: Dynamics Underlying the Emergence of a Modular Governance Architecture 
Governance activities 
of Standard-Setters:
Based on partly 
overlapping interests 
& agendas
Global landscape:
Discourse and policies
Local producer contexts: 
Niche experiments and 
practice adaptations
Experimentation:
Creating new
governance modules
Legitimation:
Negotiating content 
of modules with peers
(Re-) Integration: 
Putting modules in 
emerging architecture
Engage in
Engage in
Enable & 
constrain
Provide 
framing 
for
Inform
Inform
Provide 
Framing for
Sector-wide promotion of 
‘sustainable practice’ 
through modular 
governance architecture
 
 
 
 
